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Everything we think we know about defeating the insider threat may not be wrong. It 
just fails to solve the problem. Background investigations are easily sidestepped.  
Institutional inquisitors – whether security staffs, auditors, cyber network custodians, 
or other corporate sentinels – repeatedly miss unmasking the infiltrator or saboteur 
until it is too late. Yet most organizations rely precisely on these sentinels as the first, 
last, and only line of defense. After all, it is their assigned job. At the same time, the 
sentinels’ invasive audits and technical monitoring alienate essential employees while 
posing minimal hurdles to those whose aim is our ruin. Nevertheless, our institutions 
and received wisdom tell us to invest ever more resources in such defenses with dismal 
track records and unproven deterrent value. Might there be a better way? 
THE PROBLEM 
A 2008 report to the President explained the insider threat problem this way: 
Essentially, the threat lies in the potential that a trusted employee may betray 
their obligations and allegiances to their employer and conduct sabotage or 
espionage against them. Insider betrayals cover a broad range of actions, from 
secretive acts of theft or subtle forms of sabotage to more aggressive and overt 
forms of vengeance, sabotage, and even workplace violence. The threat posed by 
insiders is one most owner-operators neither understand nor appreciate.1 
While reports such as these underscore the potential of insider threats, trust betrayal 
remains a statistically rare phenomenon.2 If, as the literature suggests, a “miniscule 
fraction” of the people in a position to betray trust actually do so,3 then quantitative 
methods offer limited value in uncovering practical countermeasures and strategic 
innovations. After all, if most people do not violate trust to the point of becoming a 
threat to their organization, statistical surveys of willing and benign respondents are 
unlikely to reveal telltale signs of trust betrayers. Under the circumstances, a qualitative 
approach may offer more insight into dealing with insider threats bent on visiting 
irreversible harm to American infrastructure and institutional targets. Accordingly, an 
application of the Delphi method offered a means of tapping the career experiences of a 
diverse group of experts in dealing with insider threats. The Delphi study results 
highlighted fissures in the fortress wall of existing countermeasures. Delphi study 
results also led to some innovations in defending against hostile insiders.4 
DELPHI METHODOLOGY APPLIED TO INSIDER THREAT STUDY 
For this research project on insider threats, the study asked seasoned defenders, 
investigators, and line managers to answer questions and distill judgments through the 
iterative Delphi research process.5 This project consisted of recruiting a dozen experts 
from different organizations and disciplines and then asking them three series of 
questions over time. Respondents operated independently, with guarantees of 
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confidentiality, and without direct interaction with other experts. After the first round of 
questions, these respondents saw a compilation of all the answers to the first round and 
then addressed a second round of questions that were suggested by the first. Similarly, 
for the third and final Delphi round, respondents saw compilations of their aggregate 
responses to the second round of questions in addition to a final series of questions 
informed by preceding rounds.  This approach also followed the counsel of analysts who 
have claimed, “we need multidisciplinary research teams (not just geeks) investigating 
what we should look for as indicators of possibly malevolent behavior.”6    
The group of experts in this study consisted of a dozen professionals representing 
different disciplines, such as counter espionage, prevention of workplace violence, 
defense against systemic institutional fraud, corporate response to handling 
reputational risk, as well as law enforcement, military, and business profit-and-loss 
experience. Each respondent possessed at least twenty years of professional experience 
and first-hand exposure to managing or investigating insider threats. Each Delphi round 
involved transmitting questions by e-mail, with responses returned via e-mail, with at 
least two weeks between rounds. All respondents agreed to participate in the study 
under standard confidentiality protections and with repeated reminders that no 
classified or proprietary information was being solicited for the study. Of the dozen 
experts who agreed to participate in three rounds of Delphi surveys, 100 percent saw the 
process through from start to finish, from January to April, 2009.7 Initially, Delphi 
experts suggested that traditional countermeasures, such as random audits, would stand 
fast between a hostile insider and a devastating attack. However, by the time the same 
experts were induced to trade places and evaluate their own countermeasures in terms 
of how they would impede the experts themselves from carrying out a successful insider 
attack, the story had changed dramatically.   
Initially, the hostile insider seemed likely to emerge as a disgruntled employee with 
the capacity to plan a devastating attack and the arcane knowledge to make the most of 
the opportunity.8 Indicators of this trust betrayer included unexplained anger and other 
suspicious behaviors, like undue secrecy and self-aggrandizement, potentially serving as 
red flags. Finally, countermeasures such as random audits, monitoring of employees, 
and investigations appeared likely to offer value as ways to thwart this kind of insider. 
By the end of the Delphi process, however, the same experts arrived at different 
conclusions. Their judgments flew in the face of this accepted wisdom. Despite being 
unable to see each other’s observations or remarks, the Delphi experts ultimately 
converged on findings that ran counter to their own initial assumptions and to the 
accepted wisdom on insider threat defense. 
COUNTERINTUITIVE FINDINGS 
Infiltrators More Likely Threat than Disgruntled Insiders 
Research results suggested that the terrorist attacker targeting institutions such as 
stewards of critical infrastructure would more likely use an infiltrator than a disgruntled 
insider already in place.9 A career employee with long-term access and in-depth 
knowledge of inner workings will necessarily know more about how to dismantle the 
organization or its critical assets than an infiltrator new to the entity. The same 
careerist, given time and inclination to plan, is in the best position to develop and carry 
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out a devastating attack that circumvents defenses. However, the disgruntled insider is 
potentially unstable and difficult to control. According to the Delphi experts, this 
employee is not a joiner and is likely to be too egocentric to accept direction readily  
Volatility makes this person an operational risk who may compromise details of an 
attack out of disagreement with the particulars or out of spite at not being consulted on 
every move. 10  
Additionally, in the age of the Internet and with critical infrastructure targets that 
have traditionally operated openly without the security precautions of the national 
security sector, targets and their employees remain highly accessible. Their critical 
assets are often immobile. Thus, in contrast to weapons classified for reasons of national 
security, critical infrastructure cannot be relocated or concealed once its location and 
operating details have been compromised. In this context, the targeting information 
necessary for mounting an infrastructure attack need not be so esoteric as to be 
available exclusively to a career insider with very detailed knowledge.   
Instead, as the Delphi experts reasoned, an infiltrator who gets through the door, 
even at a relatively low level for a limited time, should be able to accumulate enough 
details to enable an attack without having to spend years masquerading as an innocuous 
employee. We also need to remember that many infrastructures and institutions are 
desperate for talent and have aging work forces with few systemic arrangements for 
recruiting, training, and deploying successors. Thus, as one expert noted, infrastructure 
employers are prone to welcome any skilled workers without criminal convictions who 
show an interest in accepting entry-level positions. The same employers make frequent 
use of contractors who soon gain unfettered access to their systems.  This situation gives 
an infiltrator two paths of entry: as a direct employee or as a contractor. Infiltrators may 
even try the two approaches concurrently without fear of one rejection influencing the 
possibility of another. In this milieu, if the remaining defenses (described below) are 
also flawed, the chances for a successful attack begin to tilt more in favor of an infiltrator 
than a disgruntled insider. The infiltrator may not have quite so much access, but he can 
definitely be better controlled, focused, and more disciplined about concealing telltale 
indicators of an impending attack to avoid compromising the attack.  
Weakness of Traditional Defenses 
The weaknesses of traditional defenses against this insider threat appear more evident if 
depicted in the context of the mutual challenges of infiltrator and defender, as Figure 1 
illustrates.11 
 








Figure 1.   Traditional Situation:  Infiltrator Meets Infrastructure 
Figure 1 depicts the situation in which infiltrator and infrastructure find themselves 
when these countermeasures and their limitations impinge upon each other in the 
traditional scheme of penetration and defense. In this conceptualization, the adversary’s 
job is to select a target, prepare an infiltrator, and gain entry into the target to the point 
of being able to probe and maneuver with unimpeded access. It falls to the infiltrator to 
pass the background check and then enter and pass a probationary period during which, 
or at least after which, the infiltrator anticipates having sufficient freedom of maneuver 
to gather information unimpeded by any close scrutiny or interference. The infiltrator 
eluding detection or interference is free to operate in the dark corners of insufficient 
oversight and management, as long as his behavior and work performance do not 
deviate so much from the norm as to invite attention.   
Infiltrator Step 1:  Get Through Screening  
The standard screening, or pre-employment, background investigation presents a low 
hurdle to the prepared. As long as the infiltrator does not have a record of criminal 
convictions or obvious disqualifications (like inability to lift twenty-five pounds in a job 
whose essential functions require some manual labor) he or she has little to fear from 
the third party consumer reporting agency performing the background check.    
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The more invasive background and update investigations permitted for national 
security employment are not available for the public and private sector employers who 
operate the nation’s critical infrastructure. Nor is it feasible to demand the same level of 
scrutiny for a maintenance mechanic as for an intelligence analyst. Besides, the telltale 
component of such investigations – the probe for financial irresponsibility – is only 
useful in cases where trust betrayal is primarily driven by money, exemplified in the so-
called “marketplace espionage” most frequently observed in counterintelligence cases of 
the 1980s.12 However, as Herbig discovered in her study of trust betrayal in such cases 
over time, the trend in the last ten years has changed: the most common driver for 
today’s traitors is divided loyalties, i.e., ideological rather than monetary motivation.13 
Consequently, yesterday’s focus on finances as an indicator of possible trust betrayal 
offers limited value in detecting today’s traitors who will be living well within their 
means. They will also be showing no signs of the kind of debt indicative of financial 
hardship that would make them targets for bribery or ostensible candidates for selling 
out their employers to relieve financial distress.   
Similarly, an infiltrator sent into an infrastructure employer to attack it will be 
unlikely to draw attention by amassing bad debts that set off financial responsibility 
alarms, assuming a credit report is even requested as part of the background 
investigation. Nor will this individual invite negative scrutiny through drunk driving or 
criminal convictions that the average background investigation detects through a 
standard check of superior court records in counties of residence and of employment.14 
Insulating the infiltrator even more from what such background investigations uncover 
is that the infiltrator is already under the control and sponsorship of a primary, albeit 
undisclosed, employer: the attacker. Thus, the infiltrator is seeking infrastructure 
employment not so much for monetary or professional reward as for access to an 
assigned target. Meanwhile, the attacker coaches the infiltrator to avoid actions that 
would raise eyebrows. Moreover, the larger and more sophisticated the attacker’s 
organization, the more candidates available to choose from in qualifying an infiltrator, 
and the more likely that the ultimate selectee will arrive on the job with an unblemished 
record. 
To complicate matters more for defenders, the legal constraints affecting employers 
in America severely limit a critical infrastructure steward’s ability to expand the scope of 
a background investigation or to use its product in any way that is not demonstrably 
related to a given job vacancy.15 The same applies to any program for performing update 
investigations on existing employees. As one industry guideline cautions, “The 
consideration of extraneous information that is not a valid predictor of job performance 
can create a source of liability.”16 In the context of employment laws prohibiting job 
discrimination yet defending privacy, it is the rare hiring manager who dares flaunt such 
guidance by rejecting any otherwise qualified applicant, even if subtle or stated 
antipathies against the United States surface during the hiring process. Fidelity to 
America is seldom called out as a hiring criterion for work at a utility that operates 
critical infrastructure. In the broader context of employment law, anti-discrimination 
protections, and limitations on the extent to which employers may practically scrutinize 
applicants for work at critical infrastructure sites, background investigations are 
unlikely to unmask any but the most unsophisticated of infiltrators.   
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Update investigations, if performed at all, typically come after seven years because 
this is the standard limit that many states and the Fair Credit Reporting Act recognize as 
the maximum period for making criminal history available for retrieval for employment 
purposes.17 Like pre-employment investigations, updates performed through a credit 
bureau or other agency falling under the rules of this Act must also be fully disclosed to 
the subject of the investigation. An infiltrator requiring more than seven years to gather 
insider information to support an infrastructure attack would have aged enough to cast 
doubt on his or her motivational zeal and to be suspected of beginning to identify too 
closely with the target. 
2. Infiltrator Step 2:  Gather Information 
As Figure 1 shows, once safely through the door the infiltrator now interacts primarily 
with fellow employees and a supervisor, who supplies the institution’s direct oversight 
during the probationary period. Corporate sentinels, whether security staff, auditors, 
information systems guardians of the computer network, human resources recruiters, 
attorneys, or others with assigned responsibility for various monitoring functions, rarely 
interact with the new employee. They may participate in a new-hire orientation, but 
otherwise they deal with the newcomer only if the latter’s actions or questions affect 
their various disciplines. The new employee benefits from a grace period during which 
minor transgressions committed in the course of gathering information are easily 
dismissed as a rookie’s excusable faux pas. Unless the neophyte does something 
egregious to excite remark, he or she is unlikely to face a random audit or active 
monitoring of computer key strokes, or time and duration of access into a given work 
space. On the rare occasion when an infiltrator’s actions invite challenge, all that are 
necessary to deflect focused attention of corporate sentinels are a ready apology and a 
profession of ignorance. 
To further limit opportunities for detecting an infiltrator’s suspicious gathering of 
insider information via random audit, Delphi experts in business and operational audit 
note that so-called random audits are seldom truly random. As one of the experts 
pointed out, the astute observer sees them coming. Moreover, many audits are 
perfunctory, particularly if auditors consider themselves overextended and loathe taking 
on the extra work of sustaining a negative finding. As one analyst found in a longitudinal 
study of organizations susceptible to accountability failures, cases are “resource 
intensive and, as a result, enforcement is necessarily selective.”18 This explains why a 
resource-intensive audit will not be “wasted” on a neophyte who has still not even 
passed probation. 
In many, if not most critical infrastructure environments, audits are by definition 
adversarial. They are, therefore, regarded as a necessary evil perpetrated by individuals 
who are more tolerated than esteemed. To the extent that auditors are aloof, disdainful, 
or menacing, they struggle to obtain active cooperation. One Delphi expert has seen that 
co-workers are even more likely to defend than to report a trust betrayer who has 
managed to come across as “just one of the guys.” The greater scrutiny is likely to focus 
on activities affecting financial performance or high-value losses. However, until the 
moment of attack, the infiltrator targeting critical infrastructure is unassociated with 
any loss-producing events that would invite such scrutiny. In such circumstances, it is 
the rare audit that will identify and focus sufficient attention on an infiltrator to elicit 
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anything more than an oral warning or mild rebuke. Consequently, the traditional audit 
poses no threat to the infiltrator operating with a modicum of training and 
sophistication. 
Technology exists to remotely monitor every keystroke an employee makes whether 
operating a desktop computer or a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) 
system – the principal means of controlling valves and distribution of signals, power, or 
water when handling a critical infrastructure component. It is possible to configure 
control room access so that no one individual may enter a critical area alone. It is also 
possible to monitor such areas remotely through video surveillance. These capabilities 
can theoretically prevent all but the most astute from carrying out undetected acts of 
mischief. However, when applied to the challenge of detecting and thwarting an 
infiltrator bent on attacking critical infrastructure, technology alone falls short for 
several reasons.  
First, for every device capable of tracking activity, there must exist somewhere in the 
institution a means of discriminating untoward activity from acceptable routine. A 
surveillance camera or automated log cannot by itself tell whether an operator laying 
hands on a SCADA panel is doing his job or interfering with another’s. Such a 
determination requires human judgment. True, some automated tools can approximate 
a level of human judgment, if given precise details and parameters of what kind or 
number of transactions become suspect once they exceed a certain frequency in a given 
time period or take up significantly more time than necessary. However, the effort 
needed to establish these boundaries and the resources necessary to automate 
associated triggers exceed the capacity of the average financially-strapped employer. 
Nor is this investment in proportion to the expected benefit.   
The same caution applies to the labor-intensive alternative to this technology-based 
solution: invasive snooping by a designated monitoring force. Delphi experts with career 
experience as line managers in critical infrastructures opined that such snooping 
negatively affects productivity and morale, while often leading to an unintended 
consequence. It sparks the creativity of aggrieved operators to find new ways to elude or 
defeat monitoring systems because they dislike being watched like wayward children.  
Thwarting such corporate sentinels, whether human overseers or automated devices, 
soon becomes part game, part badge of honor. Operators then transfer this knowledge of 
how to bypass what they regard as invasive monitoring to peers and newcomers alike – 
including the potential infiltrator – because they know that if all the workers are 
defeating Big Brother, then management will be unable to single out any one employee 
for punishment.   
Step 3:  Exploit Vulnerabilities 
At this point in the penetration effort, if the infiltrator has managed to survive the 
screening process and stay under the radar of corporate sentinels, inertia and initiative 
are on his side. The more he blends, the less he stands out, and the more likely he is to 
gain the unwitting support of co-workers and management alike, particularly if seen to 
be a competent team player who gets along well with others.    
One contradiction in defensive strategy highlights how traditional measures can be 
self-undermining. The common thread that unravels the foregoing defenses when 
exploited by an infiltrator or any hostile insider is a lack of active involvement on the 
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part of the workforce on the one hand, tied with what infrastructure workers perceive as 
the offensiveness of too much oversight on the other hand. One career analyst of trust 
betrayers explained the latter phenomenon by stating that vigilance against disloyalty 
“threatens the ecology of trust and raises the likelihood of disloyalty because of a 
motivation to resist excessive oversight.”19   
In this context, the institution comes to rely excessively on its corporate sentinels, viz. 
its designated watchers, such as security staff, leaving the rest of the workforce 
indifferent to a defensive role that the employees and managers leave to such specialists. 
Meanwhile, the capacity of these sentinels, to focus limited resources on discovering a 
needle-in-the-haystack level of visibility of an insider threat is constrained by 
infrastructure operator resistance to draconian security measures that are too costly and 
impede operations. Into the space between general employee indifference and 
constraints on corporate sentinels, the infiltrator and any insider threat can create a 
dark corner to carry out hostile activity with impunity. 
ALTERNATIVE: NO DARK CORNERS APPROACH 
One way to overcome the vulnerabilities in the foregoing defensive measures is to re-
examine Figure 1’s penetration sequence in light of how a different strategy might apply 
the same institutional resources to better effect.  Figure 2 shows such an alternative end-
state. 
 
Figure 2.   Desired End-State for Infrastructure vs. Hostile Insider 
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What has changed? First, the screening process no longer relies excessively on a 
search for indicators that uncover neither an infiltrator nor other hostile insider. As one 
executive who studied trust betrayal for an entire career pointed out, many experts find 
that personnel investigations do not prevent espionage or detect those who may commit 
such a crime.20 Instead, the process now pays special attention to verifying identity.  It 
takes advantage of government resources through a program that U.S. Immigrations 
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) makes available to companies and infrastructure 
institutions alike: ICE Mutual Agreement for Government and Employers 
(ICE/IMAGE). For a fraction of the resources necessary to conduct update 
investigations of utility employees every seven years,21 infrastructure employers can 
instead devote more attention to verifying basic identity and right-to-work 
authorizations of new hires in order to defend against potential infiltrators. They 
improve their internal capacity via a federally-funded program that trains human 
resources recruiters to check credentials and gives access to Social Security and 
immigration databases to facilitate verification of employment eligibility.22  
The new screening program will not necessarily catch all infiltrators any more than it 
will defeat individuals who enter the institution benevolently and only later develop 
hostility and a propensity to betray or destroy. However, the program will reduce the 
ability of terrorist organizations to infiltrate their agents with falsified credentials which, 
absent increased scrutiny, receive only token examination from the most junior clerk 
assigned to processing employment applications. This is why Figure 2 shows a smaller X 
next to the arrow depicting the infiltrator’s first task. The new screening program 
complicates the challenge for the infiltrator, but does not eliminate it altogether.  
More importantly, however, the biggest change from the Figure 1 traditional 
approach to the Figure 2 alternative is the active engagement of the general employee 
population. Employees now support the screening process by at least verifying 
credentials through their own professional and trade networks. The immediate 
supervisor monitors the employee closely throughout the probationary period. During 
this interval, the new default expectation is not that all newcomers pass probation 
absent egregious incidents, but that all are released from employment unless they 
demonstrate talent worth keeping. This demonstration must satisfy not only the 
supervisor but teammates as well, which forces close interaction on a daily basis. 
Moreover, during probation, new hires are treated like student pilots who are not ready 
for solo flight – never left alone in the cockpit. Only, in the case of critical infrastructure, 
the student is a new employee and the cockpit is any critical asset or control system.  
At the same time, this alternative approach requires a culture of constant team 
interaction and self-monitoring that reduces opportunities for probing and undermining 
the institution clandestinely. This approach eliminates the dark corners represented by 
the black boxes in Figure 1 because, in Figure 2, employee oversight means there are 
fewer places to hide. This is the No Dark Corners approach that configures the job to 
reduce chances for a sole individual occupying a sensitive area undetected. It breathes 
life into this security prescription of management expert Tom Peters when exhorting 
security professionals not to see their contribution exclusively in the character of 
corporate sentinels: 
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I don’t want you to be security people for the organization, but to make everyone 
else in the organization a security person. You don’t “do” security.  You help all 
the employees do it … You win the game when I and my colleagues are the real 
security people in the place. 23 
At the heart of the cultural shift, this alternative approach also increases the opportunity 
to detect any insider threat because it spreads defensive responsibility pervasively, 
rather than relying exclusively on corporate sentinels. 
BALANCING TRUST AND TRANSPARENCY: THE CO-PILOT MODEL 
How can a cultural shift in the workplace create a team whose members constantly 
monitor each other without undermining the trust necessary for internal cohesion? On 
the surface, it would appear that such a team is merely relieving assigned corporate 
sentinels of their snooping duties.  After all, as organizational consultant Stephen Covey 
has observed, suspicion can generate the behaviors that managers and leaders are 
defending against, thus fostering a collusive environment of distrust.24 Extending the 
pilot and cockpit metaphor from the preceding discussion on employment probation 
periods, however, offers an answer to this apparent contradiction. 
In line with the cultural shift to internal team monitoring, every team member 
becomes not an inquisitor but a co-pilot. The key elements of the co-pilot definition that 
apply are of a “qualified pilot who assists or relieves the pilot but is not in command.”25 
The co-pilot has a vested interest in maintaining safe altitude and air speed and in 
arriving on schedule at the right destination. Applied to the work team, this model 
makes every team member a co-pilot. Neither a co-pilot nor a team member need 
become a snoop or tattletale. Yet both should be in a position to fully monitor what is 
happening in the cockpit or control room, with aircraft gauges or with SCADA displays. 
In this context, a co-pilot level of engagement becomes cohesion producing because it 
demonstrates a shared sense of ownership in the team’s work.26  
While many parts of a given countermeasure carry forward into the new framework, 
the means of applying the countermeasure changes fundamentally. No Dark Corners 
transforms invasive techniques into performance gauges for work teams. A video 
camera monitoring a critical process involving hazardous materials should now be 
welcome as a way for a fellow team member to be able to summon assistance if another 
team member in the area gets hurt – not as a spy camera for helping bosses catch 
subordinates in the act of violating established procedures. The same cultural shift 
should make team members appreciate having a back-up control room operator or 
lineman within earshot or line of sight, rather than bristle at the thought of not being 
trusted to work alone. Embracing the co-pilot model should transform additional 
physical or electronic monitoring into a welcome means of summoning assistance. It 
should also limit opportunities for a hostile insider to act against the institution. 
Ultimately, greater transparency and work redesign should limit opportunities for 
clandestine and damaging activities by eliminating the dark corners that insider threats 
need to do their worst. 
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CONTRAST WITH TRADITIONAL APPROACH 
Applying the No Dark Corners strategy communicates to the would-be insider threat 
that someone may be watching. In a traditional approach, the watcher is a corporate 
sentinel, and there are seldom enough of these watchers to monitor every process or 
venue. By contrast, in a No Dark Corners arena, the one who may be watching is a co-
worker who has a proprietary interest in the institution and will therefore act to defend 
it. 
Figure 3 highlights key features of this strategy, showing innovations, as well as what 
management authority Peter Drucker emphasized as a primary duty of all organizations:  
organized abandonment of processes and strategies that are no longer working.27 A 
method of fostering the creation of innovative strategies according to some observers, 
this grid challenges the institution to act on four key features in order to arrive at 
meaningful innovation.28  
 
 
Figure 3.   Key Features of No Dark Corners Strategy29 








As Figure 3 shows, measures that impede an infiltrator’s ability to surveil or strike take 
precedence over measures that are easily bypassed and offer negligible value in 
defeating an insider threat. Organizing these measures to contrast them with the 
traditional defenses that accepted wisdom favors underscores even more the 
distinctions of the No Dark Corners approach. Figure 4 presents this contrast in the 
form of a strategy canvas where the status quo appears in red and a breakaway challenge 




Figure 4.   Strategy Canvas:  Traditional vs. No Dark Corners 
The strategy canvas is at once a gauge and a framework for revealing where traditional 
insider defenses have faltered and where the innovations of No Dark Corners offer 
alternatives to reduce chronic vulnerabilities. The canvas visually communicates the 
current state of affairs in insider threat defense (in red) while also showing the potential 
for breaking new ground (in blue) to reduce susceptibility to infiltrators and, by 
extension, to any hostile insider. 
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In addition to adjusting defensive measures already discussed at length throughout 
these pages, Figure 4 draws attention to three particular innovations that reflected 
insights both of Delphi experts and of published analysts of trust betrayers. These three 
are close probation, transparency on the job, and team self-monitoring. All three 
measures offer productivity value, as well as defensive benefits.   
Close Probation 
As one study shows in extolling the virtues of close probation for example, 
“organizations that systematically integrate new employees enjoy lower turnover, and 
the recruits report greater commitment and job satisfaction.”30 This and the other tools 
intend to defeat hostile insiders through the kind of scrutiny that corporate sentinels 
cannot match, namely, the scrutiny of a co-worker, or what one analyst calls a “citizen-
sentry.” 31 
In critical infrastructure institutions, probationary periods are the ideal means of 
rejecting a new hire for any reason, without having to meet the rigors of bargaining unit 
constraints that are the equivalent of academic protections for tenured professors. Yet, 
Delphi-respondent experience shows that two parts of the probation process are under-
exploited. Hiring managers hesitate to release probationary employees, particularly if 
the internal hiring process is lengthy, complicated, and demanding of management 
time. To make matters worse, in many cases, the longer a vacancy goes unfilled, the 
greater the chance of losing that position, as upper management can see that work goes 
on despite the vacancy. Finally, in areas where supervision is traditionally lax, 
mentoring and monitoring of probationary employees is absent, thereby  predisposing 
hiring managers to keep the probationary employee by default.  
In reversal of this process, No Dark Corners puts a premium on using the probation 
period as a line of institutional and infrastructure defense. The default shifts away from 
keeping the new hire absent overwhelming evidence of a problem. Instead, the default 
becomes termination at the first sign of any problem and automatic release at the end of 
probation absent ostensible proof that the new employee adds value. The only way for 
this proof to surface is through close supervision, which means active engagement of 
front-line supervisors and fellow members of a work team. The supervisor acts as the 
pilot, with the rest of the team members as co-pilots – all having a vested interest in 
assuring that anyone joining their ranks can be trusted in their institution’s equivalent 
of the cockpit. 
Transparency on the Job  
In keeping with the new strategy for maximizing the value of probationary periods, 
transparency on the job means that every task, operation, or action performed at a 
critical infrastructure site should be within the actual or virtual line-of-sight of a 
knowledgeable peer or supervisor. Evoking the two-person-integrity rules of working in 
some classified environments,32 every job and work space should be designed to 
maximize visibility to peers and minimize opportunities for clandestine, hostile action. 
While critical infrastructure employers seldom have the staffing to implement a forced 
buddy system like this under all circumstances, the selective use of surveillance cameras 
to monitor critical operations can at least reduce infiltrator assurance that clandestine 
attivities will remain undetected. The deterrent value of this kind of system is analogous 
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to that of having surveillance cameras and their associated video monitors openly placed 
near the cash register at retail convenience stores. This practice in retail security is 
thought to deter robbery because of the uncertainty it creates about who may be 
watching in the eyes of the potential robber.33 Process-monitoring cameras, which assist 
with environmental watching of systems to be sure they are operating within design 
tolerances and of hazardous areas in order to dispatch rescue crews, are already 
commonplace at infrastructure sites, as are security surveillance cameras and access 
control systems in public areas, particularly in Britain.34 Designing new work sites, as 
they come online, to increase such visibility reduces the perception of concealment 
opportunities and increases the opportunity for fully-engaged team members and other 
employees to spot untoward activity while in the course of routinely looking out for each 
other. 
Team Self-Monitoring  
Finally, No Dark Corners recognizes and seeks to exploit the difference between over-
the-shoulder audits and self-policing out of work team cohesion and pride. As a Delphi 
expert observed, the most effective use of audits occurs when internalized at the work 
team level. Instead of shrinking from oversight as a form of witch hunt, team members 
focus on “how we can make things better” discussions. By including such discussions in 
regular team meetings and also encouraging informal one-on-one comments between 
employee and supervisor after each formal meeting, members should become their own 
most ardent diagnosticians. This self-monitoring presents an imposing threat of 
discovery for the infiltrator who may be adroit in hiding from corporate sentinels but 
cannot hide from the team. 
As another Delphi expert noted, metrics by themselves may supply only an illusion 
that management can track all work and make necessary course corrections in time. As a 
senior executive in a large infrastructure organization, he found that he did not have 
time to read, let alone check for discrepancies in employee performance based on all the 
timekeeping, output measures, budget variance, and failure analysis records available 
only to senior executives. So, this expert pushed out these data to front-line managers 
who could at least track themselves and their own team. As a result, the managers and 
soon the team members started gauging themselves and monitoring their own 
performance, improving effectiveness in the process. Some teams competed with each 
other in friendly rivalry. More teams and their managers, though, began competing with 
themselves, striving to beat last month’s or last year’s best record. An expert reasoned 
that this kind of self-monitoring, properly encouraged and applied to defense against 
insider threats, would present an almost insurmountable obstacle to infiltrators intent 
on an attack against critical infrastructure. 
NO DARK CORNERS LINKAGE TO OTHER SECURITY STRATEGIES 
The No Dark Corners strategy of configuring work space for maximizing opportunities 
for teammates to exercise a proprietary interest in their work and for promoting 
transparency relies on employees – legitimate insiders – defending an institution and its 
infrastructure by taking ownership. No Dark Corners is to critical infrastructure what 
Defensible Space is to community housing and Fixing Broken Windows is to community 
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policing: a defensive strategy relying on legitimate users of a given space or activity to 
exercise a proprietary interest sufficient to defeat adversary encroachment. In his 
seminal work, architect Oscar Newman examined data from housing projects in New 
York to make a case for reconfiguring residential areas to enhance the natural human 
tendency of territoriality. In his words, “defensible space is a model for residential 
environments which inhibits crime by creating the physical expression of a social fabric 
that defends itself.”35 
While Newman made efforts to extend his work to nonresidential environments with 
government sponsorship, the latter appeared to make little progress in the course of 
twenty years, despite considerable investment.36  
In a variation of Defensible Space applied to order maintenance in public spaces, 
James Q. Wilson and George Kelling offered Broken Windows theory ten years later.37 
Then Kelling’s follow-up research demonstrated multiple successes in crime reduction 
in major urban cities – all based on the premise that neighborhoods decay into crime 
and disorder if the little things, like broken windows, remain untended.38 Soon, vandals 
break all the remaining windows. Conversely, attention to the little things, like fixing 
broken windows, sends a communal message of a sense of ownership. This 
demonstration of proprietary interest, in turn, deters offenders, driving them away from 
defended areas.39   
No Dark Corners extends the foregoing theme of a sense of ownership to critical 
infrastructure, in a way that recalls the housing application of Defensible Space and the 
community order maintenance of Fixing Broken Windows. The difference is that while 
the other two models apply exclusively to public spaces, No Dark Corners adds private 
space into the mix,  as all critical infrastructures have control rooms and physical assets 
that are not open to the public, hence, out of the public view. Invariably, however, 
critical infrastructures also include important assets that are exposed to public view, 
such as transmission lines and aqueducts, which may be visible or accessible to 
members of the public. 
Why has this not happened before?  Because infrastructure defense is assumed to fall 
primarily into the hands of the private sector.40 By extension, the critical assets must, 
therefore, be under private control and not in the kinds of public spaces where there 
apply existing models of defense through a sense of ownership, like Defensible Space 
and Broken Windows theories. The reality, however, is that critical infrastructure may 
be impossible to secure in some cases, as in transmission lines, aqueducts, and fiber-
optic cables stretching across broad expanses of undefended territory. 
No Dark Corners reduces relatively unproductive but resource-intensive investment 
in countermeasures that an infiltrator can readily bypass. The strategy shifts exclusive 
reliance of institutions on overly specialized monitors, the corporate sentinels, to the 
larger employee population, especially the work team closest to the infiltrator or other 
hostile insider. It also redirects some investment away from moderately useful pre-
employment background investigations and unproductive update investigations, which 
may deter obvious criminals but will not defeat a hostile infiltrator.41 Instead, the 
strategy shifts this investigative scrutiny to verifying identity and right-to-work 
documentation, which takes the form of supplemental identification, and which the 
Immigrations and Customs Enforcement arm of DHS is advancing through its 
ICE/IMAGE program of enhancing the capacity of all employers, including 
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infrastructure stewards, to close the door to a major penetration vulnerability in the 
hiring process. 
At the same time, this new strategy brings to bear the tools of close probation, work 
redesign for transparency, and self-monitoring for greater engagement of the employee 
population and, in particular, the work team.   
Envisioning a No Dark Corners Workplace 
In a No Dark Corners workplace, standard screening will have new emphasis on identity 
and right-to-work verification, and false credentials will be subject to discovery, making 
it particularly difficult for a foreign adversary to penetrate an American institution. 
Close probation means an infiltrator will face unabated scrutiny, supervision, and 
evaluation. Similarly, a fully-engaged employee population and work flow design that 
eliminates hiding places while promoting transparency will reduce opportunities for the 
infiltrator gathering sensitive information unrelated to the individual job and breaching 
protocols under the banners of ignorance or deficient supervision. Corporate sentinels 
previously mistrusted will be accessible to team members to follow up on their concerns 
and suspicions. In the process, the sentinels themselves will become part of the 
extended family seen as supporting the work team. Opportunities for unfettered, 
clandestine access will be severely constrained, subject to monitoring by people or 
devices, and too limited to exploit reliably. 
Limitations and Opportunities for Further Research 
Just as Kelling’s 1996 work on Broken Windows took experimental efforts in several 
municipalities to support the theory he and James Q. Wilson first espoused in 1982, No 
Dark Corners awaits the refinement and validation that would follow introduction of 
this model into an institution. Ideally, such an institution could be compared to a sister 
organization or agency of comparable size and function. Results of this comparison 
would draw on a broad array of metrics, including measures of general productivity, 
positive or negative impacts attributed to insiders, and relative expenditure of resources 
for defense against adversaries. Alternatively, a single institution adopting the No Dark 
Corners strategy could compare itself across a similar scale to determine the impact of 
the new strategy in relation to previous experiences with insider problems under 
alternative defensive strategies. 
CONCLUSION 
As this study suggests, a hostile insider needs three essentials to carry out an attack:  a 
worthy target, an open door, and a dark corner. Any adversary seeking to strike a 
devastating blow against any institution needs the same. 
Level 1, or primary, critical infrastructures, such as power, water, and 
telecommunications make worthy targets. Not only are some of them irreplaceable, their 
damage or destruction leads to cascading failure of other, interdependent infrastructure 
components, from banking and finance to emergency responders, from transportation 
and logistics to food and agriculture. All depend on the Level 1 infrastructures – on 
worthy targets. 
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The open door comes from a traditional culture of unrestricted public access. This 
openness flourishes because public and investor-owned utilities must answer to a 
demanding public, ratepayers, and various regulatory agencies. Even when these 
infrastructure stewards have critical assets to protect, when it comes to their public 
customers, they cannot be perceived as having something to hide. In this environment, 
defenses against infiltrators or any type of insider threat require a cultural shift. The 
challenge is to close the door to infiltrators while leaving it open to legitimate workers. 
Even if an infiltrator sets sights on a worthy infrastructure target and exploits weak 
defenses, he or she still needs a dark corner free of oversight or restraint in order to 
gather pre-strike intelligence and then initiate an attack without risk of timely 
intervention and defeat. The best way to defeat such an attack is to remove the dark 
corners. 
Second, as previously mentioned, Americans have a penchant for relying on 
technology to solve problems. This tendency places a premium on depth at the 
occasional expense of breadth. As a result, in addressing the insider threat to critical 
infrastructure, the tendency leaves us attempting to penetrate with the intensity and 
focus of a laser what we should be illuminating with a flashlight. No matter how deep 
the laser drills, it points to only a fragment of the entire picture. Caught in the laser’s 
beam, a clever insider can mask or explain away hostile activities with relative impunity. 
The No Dark Corners approach substitutes the flashlight of open team and employee 
engagement for the laser of limited and specialized monitoring of corporate sentinels 
working in secret. It represents a method of implementing layered defenses, particularly 
on the front lines of detection and intervention: where critical operations take place. 
Despite generations of study, the insider threat remains alive. Infiltrators continue to 
pose a risk to critical infrastructure.  There are no easy answers. No Dark Corners shows 
promise, however, as an approach that fills the gaps in traditional defenses. In so doing, 
this approach stands poised to deliver an important benefit for defenders: the victory of 
ownership over surprise. 
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